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NO PAPERS? YOU CAN’T HAVE WATER: A CRITIQUE OF
LOCALITIES’ DENIAL OF UTILITIES TO
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
Azadeh Shahshahani
Kathryn Madison
ABSTRACT
Access to utility services is a crucial part of a person’s ability to live and
make a home in a particular place. For those who are denied service by the
local agency or company that provides public utilities—like electricity and
water—there are very few ways to achieve a decent and dignified life in that
locality. Even in the twenty-first century, some households in the United States
face the risk of going without electricity or running water in their homes
because of their national origin or immigration status. In Alabama, utility
service providers have declined to provide service to applicants who cannot
provide a Social Security Number (SSN) or specific identity documents that are
not available to undocumented immigrants. At least two cities in Georgia have
similar policies. The practice of denying utility services to individuals who
cannot provide a SSN violates U.S. federal law and is contrary to international
human rights norms and obligations. In this Article, we will discuss two
approaches to this problem. First, we will discuss options for challenging these
policies under U.S. law. The Privacy Act may be utilized to challenge state and
local government policies that require SSN disclosure for utility service, while
the Fair Housing Act (FHA) provides a basis to challenge any government or
private utility provider based on the disparate impact of these policies on
noncitizens and certain racial groups. Second, we will analyze how such utility
service denials violate international human rights treaties and norms
regarding security of the person, adequate standards of living, the right to
water, and the right to equal treatment. Together, these domestic and
 Azadeh Shahshahani is Legal & Advocacy Director with Project South. Azadeh has worked for a
number of years in North Carolina and Georgia to protect the human rights of immigrants and Muslim, Middle
Eastern, and South Asian communities. She previously served as National Security/Immigrants’ Rights Project
Director with the ACLU of Georgia. Azadeh is a past president of the National Lawyers Guild. She is a 2004
graduate of the University of Michigan Law School. The authors would like to thank Max T. Eichelberger and
Lee Bance for their research help with this article.
 Kathryn Madison is a 2015 graduate of Yale Law School.
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international legal authorities provide a basis for immigrants’ rights and
human rights advocates to challenge these policies in court and lobby against
the adoption of such policies.
INTRODUCTION
Access to utility services is a crucial part of a person’s ability to live and
make a home in a particular place. For those who are denied service by the
local agency or company that provides public utilities—like electricity and
water—there are very few ways to achieve a decent and dignified life in that
locality. Some households might be fortunate enough to find a rental unit
where the landlord provides the utility service. Otherwise, the individuals and
families are forced to either move to a different place or go without utility
service in their homes.
Even in the twenty-first century, some households in the United States face
the risk of going without electricity or running water in their homes because of
their national origin or immigration status. In Alabama, utility service
providers have declined to provide service to applicants who cannot provide a
Social Security Number (SSN) or specific identity documents that are not
available to undocumented immigrants.1 Human Rights Watch reports that
some Alabama families lost utility service to their homes or were even forced
to relocate to another state as a result of these policies.2 At least two cities in
Georgia, LaGrange and Calhoun, have similar policies.3
Families who are unable to comply with a city utility provider’s SSN
requirement have very few options to obtain housing within the city.4 When no
adult member of the household is able to contract for utility services, the
family must look for rental housing where the landlord provides the utility
services or the utility account is in someone else’s name. However, should that
arrangement fall through, these families would be forced to leave the city or
risk going without utility service to their homes.
1 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO WAY TO LIVE: ALABAMA’S IMMIGRANT LAW 14–16 (2011),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1211ForUpload_2.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Georgia Utility Service Application, LAGRANGE, https://harris.lagrange-ga.org/utilitydocuments/
Utility%20Application%20Form.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2017); Establish/Discontinue Service, CITY OF
CALHOUN, GA, http://www.cityofcalhoun-ga.com/utilities/customer-service/establishing-service/ (last visited
Jan. 24, 2017).
4 The observations in this paragraph are drawn generally from the authors’ experience working with
undocumented clients.

SHAHSHAHANI_MADISON GALLEYPROOFS

2017]

5/16/2017 12:20 PM

NO PAPERS? YOU CAN’T HAVE WATER

507

The practice of denying utility services to individuals who cannot provide a
SSN violates U.S. federal law and is contrary to international human rights
norms and obligations. In this Article, we will discuss two approaches to this
problem. First, we will discuss options for challenging these policies under
U.S. law. The Privacy Act may be utilized to challenge state and local
government policies that require SSN disclosure for utility service, while the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) provides a basis to challenge any government or
private utility provider based on the disparate impact of these policies on
noncitizens and certain racial groups. Second, we will analyze how such utility
service denials violate international human rights treaties and norms regarding
security of the person, adequate standards of living, the right to water, and the
right to equal treatment. Together, these domestic and international legal
authorities provide a basis for immigrants’ rights and human rights advocates
to challenge these policies in court and lobby against the adoption of such
policies.
I. DOMESTIC LAW ARGUMENTS
This Part will discuss arguments against the SSN requirement based on
U.S. law. First, we will analyze whether the Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits state
utility agencies from denying services based on an applicant’s refusal to
disclose her SSN. Second, we will analyze how the SSN policy might be
challenged under the Fair Housing Act using the disparate-impact theory
recently upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.5 Finally, we will discuss the
comparative risks and benefits of each approach, along with other factors that
should inform advocacy strategies.
A. Privacy Act and Required Disclosure of SSNs
The Privacy Act of 1974 includes a provision that severely restricts state
and local governments’ authority to require individuals to disclose their SSNs.6
The Privacy Act primarily prescribes detailed limitations on the solicitation
and use of personal information by the federal government. However, § 7 of
the Privacy Act makes it “unlawful for any federal, state, or local government
agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by
law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security
5

Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525

(2015).
6 Overview of the Privacy Act, U.S. DEP’T
number-usage (last updated July 16, 2015).

OF

JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opcl/social-security-
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number.”7 There are two exceptions: 1) if the disclosure is required by federal
statute, or 2) if the agency’s records system required a SSN pursuant to a
regulation or statute adopted before January 1, 1975.8
Although benefits may not be denied based on an applicant’s refusal to
disclose, an agency may request that applicants voluntarily disclose their SSN.
The Privacy Act requires any local government agency to provide applicants
with certain information about a request for SSN disclosure.9 First, the agency
must indicate whether the disclosure is voluntary or mandatory pursuant to one
of the above exceptions.10 Second, the agency must indicate the statutory
authority for the request, and inform the applicants about how their SSN will
be used.11
The following sections will discuss how each of the Privacy Act exceptions
and requirements might apply to a local utility agency. First, it is important to
note that § 3 of the Privacy Act defines an “individual” as a U.S. citizen or
lawful permanent resident (LPR).12 Local governments may attempt to use this
provision to argue that the Privacy Act does not apply to undocumented
persons, and the agency may deny benefits to an undocumented person for
failure to provide a SSN. In order to distinguish between a citizen or LPR—
whose refusal to disclose is protected by the Privacy Act—and an
undocumented person who does not have a SSN, the agency would have to
make an inquiry into every applicant’s immigration status. Except as permitted
by federal law, local agencies have no authority to inquire about an
individual’s immigration status, and are particularly barred from regulating a
person’s residence in the jurisdiction based on immigration status.13 However,
7

Privacy Act of 1974 § 7(a)(1), Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
Id. § 7(a)(2).
9 Id. § 7(b).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. § 3(a)(2) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)). The Trump administration has taken the
position that individuals who are neither citizens nor LPRs should be excluded “from the protections of the
Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information.” Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan.
25, 2017). This executive order could affect the success of the pre-emption argument in Privacy Act-based
challenges to the SSN requirement. See infra note 13.
13 The federal government has the sole authority to regulate immigration, and state governments may not
attempt to punish or otherwise regulate undocumented immigration. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387 (2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). In fact, “every federal court that
has considered a locality’s attempt to regulate immigration by limiting access to housing for individuals who
cannot prove citizenship or lawful residence has been found preempted.” Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee,
835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1179 (M.D. Ala. 2011), vacated as moot sub nom. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v.
Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 11-16114-CC, 2013 WL 2372302 (11th Cir. May 17, 2013). See also
8
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the definition of “individual” in the Privacy Act could affect an undocumented
person’s standing to challenge the utility denial in federal court.
1. Applicability of Privacy Act § 7 to Local Utility Providers
Advocates must be prepared to rebut arguments that § 7 of the Privacy Act
does not apply to local utility providers. First, in localities where the utility
service is privately owned, advocates must show that the utility provider is a
“government agency” for purposes of the Privacy Act. Case law interpreting §
7 is generally scarce. The only federal court to rule on this issue is in the
District of New Jersey, which has repeatedly held that a private entity can be
subject to the Privacy Act if the state or local government has “sufficient
control over and involvement in” the entity’s operations.14 In many
municipalities in Alabama and elsewhere, a department of the municipal
government provides and regulates utilities.15 But even if a private company
were involved, the requirement of sufficient control and involvement is
unlikely to be a significant hurdle; because of the highly regulated nature of
public utilities, state or local government arguably always has sufficient
control and involvement over a public utility provider to satisfy this criterion.16
Challenged utility agencies might also question whether state and local
government agencies can be sued under the Privacy Act at all. There is a
significant split among federal district and circuit courts as to whether private
individuals may sue a state or local agency under the Privacy Act.17 The
discrepancy arises because the Privacy Act was codified as a note to 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a, in a section of the United States Code that primarily deals with
administrative procedure; for example, the federal Freedom of Information Act

Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013); Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013).
14 Ingerman v. Del. River Port Auth., 630 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D.N.J. 2009), citing Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F.
Supp. 1246, 1254 (1992).
15 See, e.g., ALABAMA LOCAL GOV’T RECORDS COMM’N, MUNICIPALITIES: RECORDS DISPOSITION
AUTHORITY 1-4 (2013), http://www.archives.alabama.gov/officials/rdas/local/munRDA.pdf (“In return for
fees, municipalities may provide power, water, sewage, garbage and trash collection, and landfill services to
residents, either directly or by contracting . . . with private service vendors. They administer these operations
through either a municipal department or an incorporated or unincorporated board.”).
16 See Ala. Code § 37-1-32 (LexisNexis 2017). The statute grants the Public Service Commission
authority to “inquire into the management of the business and . . . the manner and method in which business is
conducted” by utility providers. Id. See also Ga. Code Ann. § 46-2-20 (2012) (granting broad powers to the
Georgia Public Service Commission to regulate and control the operations of utility companies).
17 See infra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.

SHAHSHAHANI_MADISON GALLEYPROOFS

510

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

5/16/2017 12:20 PM

[Vol. 31

is included in the same section.18 Section 552a(a)(1) incorporates a definition
of “agency” that only includes federal government entities.19 However, § 7 of
the Privacy Act itself explicitly includes state and local governments.20 Some
courts have refused to apply the Privacy Act to state and local governments
because of the conflicting definition of “agency” in § 552a(a)(1),21 or because
§ 7 of the Privacy Act “was never codified [and] remains in the statute only as
a historical note.”22
The Eleventh Circuit and district courts in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New
Jersey have recognized a private right of action against a state or local agency
that violates § 7 of the Privacy Act.23 However, the First, Second, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all held either that the Privacy Act does not
apply to state and local governments at all, or that there is no private right of
action against state and local governments under the Privacy Act.24
Although there appears to be an overwhelming consensus among circuits
that the Privacy Act does not allow private individuals to sue state and local
governments, there is notable variation in the courts’ reasoning and outcome
depending on the factual nature of the cases. Many of the cases interpreting § 7
of the Privacy Act merely involve vague accusations that a state entity violated
a complainant’s privacy.25 Other cases involve factual situations that are easily
distinguished from the utility denials in Alabama and Georgia.26
18

5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (2012).
20 Privacy Act of 1974 § 7(a)(1), Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a note).
21 See, e.g., Schmitt v. City of Detroit, 395 F.3d 327, 331 (6th Cir. 2005); Pennyfeather v. Tessler, 431
F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005).
22 Stoianoff v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 107 F. Supp. 2d 439, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) aff’d sub nom.
Stoianoff v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 12 F. App’x 33 (2d Cir. 2001).
23 See Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1287–92 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding a § 1983 challenge by
individuals who refused to provide their SSN on state voter registration applications); Ingerman v. Del. River
Port Auth., 630 F. Supp. 2d. 426, 440–41 (D.N.J. 2009); Greater Cleveland Welfare Rights Org. v. Bauer, 462
F. Supp. 1313, 1319–20 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Stollenwerk v. Miller, No. Civ.A. 04-5510, 2006 WL 463393 (E.D.
Penn. Feb. 24, 2006).
24 See, e.g., Perez-Santos v. Malave, 23 F. App’x 11, 12 (1st Cir. 2001); Pennyfeather, 431 F.3d at 56;
Schmitt, 395 F.3d at 329; Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 1983); Dittman v. California, 191
F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999).
25 See, e.g., Perez-Santos, 23 F. App’x at 12 (“[pro se appellant] did not make any developed argument”);
Polchowski, 714 F.2d at 752 (Seventh Circuit dismissing a case challenging disclosure of criminal history); St.
Michael’s Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981) (dismissing a challenge
brought by hospitals, not individuals, alleging violation of a laundry list of statutes and constitutional right to
privacy); Huling v. City of Los Banos, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (considering another
laundry list of claims against city police by plaintiff who was involuntarily committed); Logan v. Matveevskii,
19
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Other courts, particularly in cases involving fundamental rights or
sympathetic plaintiffs, have applied Privacy Act § 7 to state and local
governments and recognized a private right of action. The Eleventh Circuit,
which includes Alabama and Georgia, held in Schwier v. Cox that the Privacy
Act applies to states and confers a §1983 right of action.27 Schwier invalidated
Georgia’s requirement of a SSN for voter registration, and the Eleventh Circuit
has since recognized a private right of action under the Privacy Act to
challenge the state’s requirement of a SSN for a firearms license.28 Similarly, a
Pennsylvania district court enjoined state officials from denying a handgun
permit to a U.S. Army soldier who refused to disclose his SSN.29 Another
successful Privacy Act challenge was brought against New Jersey by a senior
citizen who applied for a discount on bridge tolls and was denied for failing to
disclose his SSN.30
In contrast to unsuccessful cases that only alleged vague objections to
disclosure of personal information, successful cases specifically challenged the
denial of a benefit for failure to disclose a SSN—exactly what the language of
the Privacy Act proscribes.31 This suggests a higher likelihood of success in a
suit against a state or local government for denying utility service to applicants
who refuse to provide a SSN. Further, the known incidents of utility denial
occurred within the Eleventh Circuit, which does apply the Privacy Act to state
and local governments.32 The Privacy Act is therefore an important tool for
advocates who are fighting against the denials of utility services. In the

57 F. Supp. 3d 234, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Plaintiff also makes various references throughout his submissions
to the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. It is not entirely clear on what basis and against whom Plaintiff is
attempting to assert this cause of action.”); McFarlane v. Roberta, 891 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (D. Conn. 2012)
(pro se plaintiff who vaguely referenced “breach of her rights to confidentiality ‘under the privacy act’”);
Pritzker v. City of Hudson, 26 F. Supp. 2d 433, 441 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (suit against police for requesting
plaintiff’s military records).
26 See, e.g., Pennyfeather, 431 F.3d at 56 (city employee whose SSN was disclosed during an
employment hearing); Schmitt, 395 F.3d at 328 (city sent tax-related correspondence in which SSN was
mistakenly printed on the outside of the envelope); Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1026 (upholding SSN requirement for
acupuncture license, which is permitted by a section of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act specific to professional
licenses, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16)).
27 Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1287–92.
28 Camp v. Cason, 220 Fed. App’x 976, 981 (11th Cir. 2007).
29 Stollenwerk v. Miller, No. Civ.A. 04-5510, 2006 WL 463393 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 24, 2006).
30 Ingerman v. Del. River Port Auth., 630 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D.N.J. 2009).
31 Cf. Stollenwerk v. Miller, 2006 WL 463393, at *4 (observing that the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in
Schwier is persuasive in a case involving “the collection of Social Security numbers” rather than
“dissemination” of the numbers or other information).
32 See Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1287–92 (11th Cir. 2003).
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following sections, we will use the incidents in Alabama to illustrate how the
Privacy Act applies to utility denials.
2. Determining Whether Utility Denials Violate the Privacy Act
If the Privacy Act applies to a utility provider, determining whether a SSN
requirement violates § 7 of the Privacy Act is usually simple. There are only
two exceptions to § 7: 1) the exception for disclosures required by federal
statute, and 2) the “grandfather exception” for disclosures that have been
required since before January 1, 1975.33
Under the first exception, state and local governments may deny benefits to
an individual for failure to disclose a SSN as “required by federal statute.”34
There is currently no federal statute that permits state and local governments to
require a SSN in order to provide utility service. Challenged utility providers
may claim that requiring a SSN for identity verification is permitted or
required by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA).35
FACTA is aimed at preventing identity theft, and applies to various financial
institutions and creditors including utility companies.36 However, FACTA does
not specifically mandate or permit creditors to require SSN disclosures. Rather,
utility providers must only follow regulations issued by the Federal Trade
Commission regarding “red flags” for identity theft.37 These regulations do not
include any requirement to collect SSNs, nor do they permit utility providers to
require SSNs.38
The “grandfather exception” permits state and local governments to
continue requiring SSN disclosure if their system of records has been in place
since before January 1, 1975, and the disclosure was required pursuant to

33 Privacy Act of 1974 § 7(a)(2), Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a note).
34 Id. § 7(a)(2)(A).
35 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x); see Establishing/Discontinue Service, CITY OF CALHOUN, GA,
http://www.cityofcalhoun-ga.com/utilities/customer-service/establishing-service/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
36 See Red Flag Program Clarification Act of 2010 § 2, 15 U.S.C. 1681m(e)(4), Pub. L. 111-319, 124
Stat. 3457 (Dec. 18, 2010). The Act defines “creditor” as an entity that “obtains or uses consumer reports” and
“furnishes information to consumer reporting agencies,” as most utility providers do. Id.
37 See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 § 114.
38 See Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 63718-01 (2007). We are unaware of any other federal statute that
would arguably permit state and local government agencies to require SSN disclosure for utility service.
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regulation or statute enacted prior to that date.39 This is a narrow exception, as
the challenged agency must prove that a regulation or statute specifically
required the disclosure of SSNs prior to 1975.40 However, even if the utility
agency is able to show that the grandfather exception applies, there still may be
an avenue to challenge the SSN requirement under the Privacy Act. A utility
agency whose SSN requirement is permitted by the grandfather exception must
still comply with provisions of the Privacy Act, discussed in the next section,
that require the agency to inform the applicant about the legal authority for the
SSN requirement and how the SSN will be used.
3. Privacy Act Requirements for Voluntary SSN Disclosure
The provisions of the Privacy Act that we have discussed pertain to
mandatory disclosures of a SSN. State and local governments are still free to
request a SSN, as long as the disclosure is voluntary and rights and benefits are
not denied for failure to disclose.41 However, requests for voluntary SSN
disclosure must still conform to certain Privacy Act requirements. Section 7 of
the Privacy Act provides that “any local government agency which requires an
individual to disclose his SSN shall inform the individual whether that
disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or other authority such
number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it.”42
If a state or local government purports to require a SSN without complying
with the requirements of the Privacy Act, it is likely that undocumented
individuals and even some documented individuals will be effectively deprived
of benefits. An undocumented immigrant who sees that the application for
utility service seems to require a SSN might reasonably assume that the SSN is
mandatory, and thus be deterred from applying. Immigrants are also adversely
affected by an agency’s failure to comply with the requirement to inform
applicants about how their SSN will be used. Even lawfully present
immigrants with valid SSNs may be hesitant to disclose their SSNs because
they may feel uneasy about why the government wants their information.43
39

See Privacy Act of 1974 § 7(a)(2)(B).
See id.
41 Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1287–92 (11th Cir. 2003).
42 Privacy Act of 1974 § 7(b).
43 On the tendency among Latino immigrant communities to be more reluctant to provide personal
information to government, see, for example, J. Lester Feder, Barriers to Health Care for Hispanics,
NEWSWEEK (June 7, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/barriers-health-care-hispanics-73467; Brian Stelter,
U.S. Census Uses Telenovela to Reach Hispanics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/23/business/23telemundo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
40
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Therefore, advocates for immigrants’ rights should ensure that the state or
local agency complies with the Privacy Act requirement to inform applicants
of the voluntary nature of and reasons for the disclosure.
B. Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact
Because access to utility services significantly affects access to housing,
utility denials can also be challenged under the Fair Housing Act. The Fair
Housing Act makes it unlawful to “make unavailable or deny” a dwelling to
someone based on national origin, or to discriminate based on national origin
“in the provision of services or facilities in connection” with the sale or rental
of a dwelling.44 Requiring a SSN for utility service has the effect of making
most dwellings unavailable to noncitizens who lack a SSN, and discriminating
against them in the provision of services connected with their dwellings.
Since there is rarely a public expression of discriminatory intent behind this
type of policy, advocates are most likely to succeed by showing that the SSN
requirement has a discriminatory effect on persons of various national origins,
who are a protected class under the FHA. The U.S. Supreme Court recently
confirmed that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.45 This
section will discuss the legal standards for a disparate-impact challenge under
the Fair Housing Act.
1. Relevant FHA Provisions
There are two Fair Housing Act provisions that may apply to a denial of
utility services: the section about provision of services in connection with a
dwelling,46 and the section about making unavailable or denying a dwelling.47
According to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), it is unlawful “to discriminate against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or
in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”48
In a press release regarding a settlement of a utility-denial case in Alabama,
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) officials acknowledged that utility
44

42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 (2015).
46 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
47 Id. § 3604(a).
48 Id. § 3604(b) (emphasis added).
45
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services are included in “the provision of services in connection with a
dwelling.”49 HUD’s Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity emphasized: “Equal access to utility services is fundamental to
fair housing.”50 The settlement agreement, which arose out of allegations that
the utility company discriminated against Latino applicants, included a
requirement that the company “develop and publish a list of alternative
eligibility or identification documents that do not rely solely on Social Security
numbers and clarify which identity documents are required to qualify for
service.”51 Advocates should point to this agreement to demonstrate that HUD
interprets the FHA to prohibit SSN requirements for utility services.
Advocates may also argue that the utility denials are prohibited under
§ 3604(a), which makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”52 A utility provider’s
refusal to provide services to an individual effectively makes most dwellings
unavailable to that individual; the individual may not own a home, and may
not rent most dwellings except dwellings whose landlord provides utilities.
Therefore, the FHA’s “otherwise make unavailable” language arguably applies
to utility denials.
There is only one reported case, which is from the District of Arizona,
regarding the application of the “make unavailable” provision to utility denials.
The court reasoned that, while the denial of utility services may make a home
less habitable, this does not make the home “unavailable” or constitute a
“denial of housing.”53 However, that case arose from a quite unusual factual
situation, in that a religious sect dominated the town government and the
plaintiff was denied utility service as retaliation for leaving the church.54 Also,
after appealing, the plaintiff in that case ultimately won a multimillion-dollar

49 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD and Huntsville Utilities Reach Agreement
Settling an Allegation of Discrimination Against Prospective Hispanic Residential Customers (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2012/HUDNo.12-123A.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
53 Cooke v. Colorado City, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1112 (D. Ariz. 2013).
54 Id. at 1100.
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verdict.55 This suggests that the “otherwise make unavailable” argument has a
chance of succeeding, although advocates should be prepared to explain why
the Arizona court’s “less habitable” reasoning does not apply.
2. National Origin as a Protected Class
A successful Fair Housing Act challenge requires the plaintiff to show not
just that there was discrimination, but that the discrimination was directed
against one of the protected classes enumerated in the FHA.56 Because
virtually everyone who lacks a SSN is a noncitizen, denial of utility services to
people who lack a SSN constitutes discrimination based on national origin.57
Further, if an area’s immigrant community is predominantly comprised of
Latinos or members of another racial group, discrimination against people
without SSNs may constitute discrimination based on race.
Proponents of the SSN requirement and other requirements for proof of
immigration status will argue that discrimination based on immigration status
is different from discrimination based on national origin.58 Documented
immigrants, these proponents might argue, have a SSN and thus will not be
affected by the requirement. Proponents of the SSN requirement may argue
that its only adverse effect is on undocumented immigrants specifically, who
are not a protected class under the FHA.
To rebut these arguments, first it is important to note that not all
immigrants are issued a SSN, even if they reside in the United States legally.
SSNs are routinely issued only to noncitizens who are authorized to work in
the United States (and thus required to pay into Social Security).59 A
noncitizen may lack a SSN if he is in the process of obtaining a workauthorized immigration status, or possesses lawful immigration status that does

55 See Jim Dalrymple, Family Wins Lawsuit Against Polygamous Towns, Gets Millions, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (Mar. 21, 2014, 11:11 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/57710092-78/cookes-family-thursdaywalker.html.csp.
56 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(e).
57 Cf. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 49 (reporting allegations that utility
company discriminated based on national origin by requiring SSN).
58 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FAIR HOUSING –
HOW TO DEAL WITH DISCRIMINATION (2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fair-housing-how-to-dealwith-discrimination.
59 See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 05-10096, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS FOR NONCITIZENS (2015),
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10096.pdf.
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not include work authorization.60 For example, an international student is
lawfully present in the United States and may wish to obtain utility services for
an apartment, but may not have a SSN. Depriving these noncitizens of utility
service or other benefits constitutes discrimination based on their national
origin.
Furthermore, a federal court has held that policies targeting undocumented
immigrants may violate the FHA’s ban on racial discrimination.61 Regardless
of the intent behind the policy, excluding undocumented immigrants from
housing has the effect of depriving those whose national origin is outside the
United States, often Latinos, of “equal access to housing.”62 The language of
the FHA protects “‘any person,’ regardless of his immigration status.”63
Policies that have a disparate impact on a protected class, such as race or
national origin, violate the FHA even if “the State was primarily discriminating
against some other, non-protected group” like undocumented immigrants.64
3. Discriminatory Effect
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,65 HUD regulations
laid out the test for whether a housing-related policy has an impermissible
disparate impact on a protected group.66 Those regulations, however, were only
promulgated as a response to the District Court’s earlier decision in Inclusive
Communities as a way to ensure that appropriate regulations regarding the
evaluation of disparate-impact claims were in place; that is, those regulations
did not precede the initial Inclusive Communities court challenge.67 The impact
of Inclusive Communities, as decided by the Supreme Court, on the validity of
the regulations is thus unclear. The majority opinion mentions the disparate
impact regulations only while reciting the procedural history of the case, while
the dissent critiques both the regulations and the Court decision.68 Until the

60 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 05-10107, FOREIGN WORKERS AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS (2015),
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10107.pdf.
61 See Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1196 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
62 Id. at 1196.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 (2015).
66 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2014).
67 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2514.
68 See id. at 2514, 2549.
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legal status of the regulations is clarified, advocates should be prepared to
demonstrate disparate impact under both the regulations and Supreme Court
precedent.
a. Disparate Impact under the HUD Regulations
While Inclusive Communities was pending, HUD promulgated regulations
that outline a three-part, burden-shifting test for the discriminatory effect of a
housing policy.69 The plaintiff must first make a prima facie case showing
“that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory
effect.”70 Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the policy “is
necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests.”71 Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who may still prove
discriminatory effect by showing that the defendant’s legitimate interests
“could be served by another policy that has a less discriminatory effect.”72
Initially, the burden is on the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case by
showing that the challenged policy causes a discriminatory effect.73 Under
Eleventh Circuit precedent that would govern the SSN requirements in
Alabama and Georgia, a plaintiff must show “that the decision has a
segregative effect” or that “it makes housing options significantly more
restrictive for members of a protected group than for persons outside that
group.”74 Utility denials based on SSN requirements make “housing options
significantly more restrictive” for members of two protected groups—
immigrants (national origin) and Latinos (race)—because a large percentage of
those groups are effectively excluded from owning a home or renting most
apartments. A showing of disparate impact requires empirical evidence of the
segregative effect or disproportionate burden on members of a protected
class.75 For example, plaintiffs in Alabama challenged a policy banning
undocumented immigrants from owning mobile homes by demonstrating both
that most noncitizens in Alabama are Latino and that Latinos are
69

24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c).
Id. § 100.500(c)(1).
71 Id. § 100.500(c)(2).
72 Id. § 100.500(c)(3).
73 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2014); see DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DISPARATE
IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT (2015).
74 Bonasera v. Norcross, 342 Fed. App’x 581, 585 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Hous. Investors, Inc. v.
Clanton, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (M.D. Ala. 1999)).
75 Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1197 (M.D. Ala. 2011), vacated, No. 1116114-CC, 2013 WL 2372302 (2013); Bonasera, 342 Fed. App’x at 585.
70
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overrepresented among mobile home owners in the state.76 To show the
discriminatory effect of utility denials, advocates should cite empirical
evidence on the percentage of noncitizens in the jurisdiction who are Latino,
and the percentage of dwellings in the area that are unavailable to them
because of the utility denials.
Upon a prima facie showing of discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to
the defendant to show that the policy furthers a “substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interest.”77 While some governments may follow Alabama’s
lead in openly enacting policies that discriminate against immigrants,78 most
defendants’ stated justifications for their SSN requirements will likely have
nothing to do with immigration.79 Rather, a challenged agency may cite the
need to run a background and credit check on the applicant or verify the
applicant’s identity.80
As long as the agency advances some kind of legitimate and
nondiscriminatory interest, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
this interest could be accomplished by a different means with a less
discriminatory effect.81 Since all utility companies and agencies have a
substantial interest in verifying applicants’ identity and creditworthiness,
plaintiffs could point to other utility companies’ practices that do not require
SSNs. Identity may be established by asking the applicant to show a passport
from any country. Further, utility providers already have procedures in place
for applicants with no credit history, such as requiring a guarantor or security
deposit.82 If the lack of a SSN means that the agency is unable to check the
applicant’s credit, the agency could address that interest in a less
discriminatory way by requiring a security deposit.
The determination of disparate impact under the HUD regulations is highly
fact-specific: the analysis and conclusion will vary significantly based on the
76

Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2014).
78 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 33.
79 See, e.g., Patricia Sullivan, Undocumented Latinos and Their Families Sue After Evictions, WASH.
POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/undocumented-latinos-andtheir-families-sue-after-evictions/2016/05/23/f11a1a88-20e4-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html.
80 Id.
81 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3).
82 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER INFORMATION: UTILITY SERVICES (2012), http://www.
consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0220-utility-services (“If you are a new utility customer or if you have a poor
payment history, the utility company may require you to pay a deposit or get a letter from someone who agrees
to pay your bill if you don’t.”).
77
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racial and ethnic makeup of the jurisdiction, the effect of each policy, and the
agency’s stated justification for the policy. Even though the policy intuitively
has a disparate impact by limiting housing options for noncitizens and certain
ethnic groups, plaintiffs must collect empirical evidence on the discriminatory
effect. Assuming the challenged agency can advance some legitimate interest
that the policy serves, plaintiffs must also research alternative ways to
accomplish that interest.
b. Disparate Impact under Inclusive Communities
Although the Court mentioned the HUD regulations as part of the
procedural history of the conflict, the decision in Inclusive Communities
neither expressly approved nor disapproved of the regulatory three-part test
discussed in the previous section.83 Instead, the Court extensively discussed the
analogy between disparate-impact claims under the FHA and under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.84 Under Title VII, which deals with
employment discrimination, disparate-impact claims are cognizable but the
employer may prevail by showing that there is a “business necessity” for the
challenged policy.85
Analogizing from its Title VII jurisprudence, the Court points out that
disparate-impact liability should not be “imposed based solely on a showing of
a statistical disparity,” but rather should be targeted toward “removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.”86 Echoing the three-step process
in the regulations, plaintiffs must first show not only a statistical disparity, but
also “a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.”87 This “robust
causality requirement” is aimed at shielding defendants from liability “for
racial disparities that they did not create,” but is a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs
to clear.88 Then, even if plaintiffs show that the defendant’s policy caused a
statistical disparity, the Court requires that defendants “be allowed to maintain
a policy if they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid interest.”89

83

See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507

(2015).
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 2512.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2523.
Id. at 2523–24.
Id. at 2523.
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Although the majority opinion echoes the first two steps of the regulatory
burden-shifting test, it is silent on the third step: whether the plaintiff may still
succeed by showing that the stated interest could be accomplished by less
discriminatory means. Advocates may argue that the third step is implied by
the analogy to Title VII and “business necessity.” If there is another way to
accomplish the stated interest, then there is no “necessity” for the policy.
Although the Fair Housing Act does not include a similar provision, advocates
may also point to provisions in Title VII that create a burden-shifting test
similar to that in the HUD regulations.90 However, since the Court in Inclusive
Communities relied heavily on the comparable language in the FHA and Title
VII, it is less likely that courts will be willing to import Title VII law in the
absence of a comparable FHA statutory provision.
Ultimately, the third step of the burden-shifting test is imperative to give
effect to the FHA and to the recent Supreme Court decision upholding the
possibility of disparate-impact claims. Utility providers and other challenged
entities will rarely state a discriminatory intent, and will almost always be able
to claim some nondiscriminatory purpose for the challenged policy.91 In order
to protect the availability of disparate-impact liability, courts must permit
plaintiffs to show that the challenged policy is not justified by “necessity”
because there exists a less discriminatory alternative.
C. Strategies for Opposing the SSN Requirement
Deciding which of the above arguments to make or emphasize will depend
primarily on whether the utility provider is a private company or public
agency. Since the Privacy Act only applies to government agencies,92 the
Privacy Act might not bar private utility providers from requiring SSNs.
Advocates seeking to challenge a private utility company’s policy under the
Privacy Act must convince the court to adopt the standard articulated by the
District Court of New Jersey, which has repeatedly held that Privacy Act § 7
applies to private companies if the state or local government has “sufficient

90

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010) (permitting complainants to show availability of “an alternative
employment practice” after a defendant demonstrates a business necessity).
91 Herb Weisbaum, When Are Social Security Numbers Required?, NBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2006, 8:25
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12359845/ns/business-consumer_news/t/when-are-social-security-numbersrequired/#.WBOTlzY0fiB.
92 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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control over and involvement in” the entity’s operations.93 On the other hand,
there is no question that the Fair Housing Act does apply to private utility
companies.94
Public utility agencies can be challenged under both the FHA and the
Privacy Act. The Privacy Act argument has one major advantage: the policy
can be challenged on its face, unlike the FHA challenge, which requires
intensive factual development on the issue of disparate impact. Any federal
court challenge should include both claims, but plaintiffs will be able to
succeed more quickly and with much less effort if the case is decided on
Privacy Act grounds. However, it is unclear whether the Privacy Act argument
would succeed in court, especially outside the Eleventh Circuit, because of the
shortage of developed case law regarding its application to state and local
agencies. Moreover, although factually dependent, a respondent agency could
quickly dispose of a Privacy Act challenge by showing that the SSN
requirement is permitted by the Privacy Act’s grandfather exception.
For these reasons, plaintiffs should be prepared to develop evidence of
disparate impact and present the more fact-intensive FHA claim in the event
that their Privacy Act challenge fails. Plaintiffs may also seek the assistance of
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, which may help
them reach a quicker and more efficient resolution to a FHA claim. Unlike
Privacy Act claims, which must be litigated in court, a FHA claim may be
brought administratively to HUD’s office of Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity, which will conduct a preliminary investigation and make efforts
at reconciliation between the parties.95 Thus, if there are strong facts to support
a FHA claim, plaintiffs may be able to resolve the issue entirely out of court. If
a federal court challenge becomes necessary, though, advocates for the
plaintiffs should be prepared to present arguments under both the Privacy Act
and Fair Housing Act, bolstered by the significant international legal
authorities discussed in the next Part.

93

Ingerman v. Del. River Port Auth., 630 F. Supp. 2d 426, 439 (D.N.J. 2009) citing Krebs v. Rutgers,
797 F. Supp. 1246, 1254 (1992). Due to the highly regulated nature of utility service provision, courts
employing this standard would most likely hold that Privacy Act § 7 applies even to private utility companies.
94 The FHA applies to all dwellings and bars private actors from discriminating, other than certain singlefamily homeowners and owners who reside in small multi-family dwellings. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (2012).
95 See 24 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1997).
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW ARGUMENTS
Denying utility services to undocumented immigrants violates international
human rights treaties and norms. We will begin this Part by examining
interpretations of international legal standards that present a strong consensus
that utility services, such as electricity and water, are either basic human rights
or so intimately bound up in the exercise of basic human rights that they
cannot be denied in any circumstance, much less on the basis of immigration
status. Second, we will examine the fact that this international consensus has
not affected U.S. government behavior so far. While doing so, we hope to
provide practicing attorneys with not only an academic understanding of this
issue, but also relevant case law and guidelines for presenting such claims in
U.S. courts.
A. International Human Rights Analysis of Utility Denials
We will examine two rights in this section. The first is the “security of the
person.” The second is “equal protection.” While both of these will be
discussed more thoroughly below, we will provide working definitions here.
Security of the person, broadly defined, is an umbrella term indicating that
every person not only desires but deserves the ability to live a life that is more
than “mere” existence, but is rather fundamentally fair, with the dignity
befitting a human being.96 This “dignity” concept is often used in the context
of actions that deprive individuals of their health, such as government intrusion
into women’s reproductive decisions97 or cruel and unusual punishment in
prisons.98 Equal protection, more robustly, is the principle that every individual
deserves similar, if not identical, access to and protection of the law.99
1. “Security of Person”
Numerous international human rights documents have reiterated that
“security of person” is a fundamental human right.100 The first human rights
document adopted internationally—which preceded the Universal Declaration
96 Human Rights Committee on its One Hundred and Seventh Session, Organizational and other matters,
Draft General Comment No. 35, art. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/107/R.3 (Jan. 28, 2013).
97 E.g., in R. v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.), the Canadian Supreme Court held that § 251 of
the Criminal Code, which had imposed penalties on performing abortions, violated a woman’s right to security
of person under § 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
98 Id.
99 See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 7 (Dec. 10, 1948).
100 See id.
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of Human Rights by about six months—was the Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man.101 Article I of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
reads that: “Every human being has the right to life, liberty, and the security of his
person.”102 This language was adopted by Resolution 217 (III) of the U.N.
General Assembly and thereafter made its way into Article 3 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states that “[e]veryone has the
right to life, liberty, and security of person.”103 This fundamental right has
reappeared several times in various human rights instruments. Article 9 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states
“[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person.”104 Article 5(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) reiterates that point:
“[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person.”105 Finally, Article 6
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter)
echoes this point: “[e]very individual shall have the right to liberty and to the
security of his person.”106
“Security of person” has proven to be a powerful legal tool in the
opposition of inhumane, cruel, and degrading treatment. Jurists, while utilizing
the UDHR as a whole, have seized upon the importance of “security of the
person” to craft legal and policy arguments against all manner of inhumane,
cruel, and degrading treatment.107 They have done this by making the trio of
rights to life, liberty, and the security of person as the entry through which all
other rights are realized.108 One of the best examples of this is the right to a
101 Inter-Am. Comm’n H. R. [IACHR], American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, (May 2,
1948), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3710.html [hereinafter American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man].
102 Id.
103 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 99.
104 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
105 Convention for the Protections of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
106 Org. of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/rev.5 (June 27, 1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). The African Charter, also referred to
as the Banjul Charter, was adopted in 1981 by the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the official body of African states. Id.
107 See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that the UDHR is an authoritative
statement of the international community); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(asserting that summary execution by a state is an international law violation which a judge uses to identify
possible violations of the laws of nations).
108 See U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER OF THE HIGH COMM’R, FACT SHEET NO.2 (REV.1), THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (June 1996), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.
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standard of living adequate for health, embodied in Article 25, because it is
incomprehensible without first understanding Article 3’s explicit prohibition
against violations against the security of a person.109
a. Standard of Living Adequate for Health and Well-Being
Utilities, and the resources that are made available to the people that use them,
are seen internationally as a necessity for health.110 Fulfilling this right to health
means that access to utilities cannot be denied. This concept was expressed
directly in 2010 by the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC).111 Expanding
upon UDHR Article 25(1), which states that “[e]veryone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services,”112 the UNHRC concluded that the right to water was
“inextricably related to . . . the right to life and human dignity.”113
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights114
(ICESCR) includes the most comprehensive article on the right to health in
international human rights law. According to Article 12(1) of the ICESCR,
State Parties recognize “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health,” while Article 12(2)
enumerates, by way of illustration, a number of “steps to be taken by the State
Parties to achieve the full realization of this right,” including 12(2)(b) and the
“improvement of all aspects of environmental . . . hygiene[.]”115 Additionally,
the right to health is recognized, inter alia, in the U.N. Convention on the
109

Id.
Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, para. 3,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/L.14 (Sept. 24, 2010), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G10/163/09/
PDF/G1016309.pdf?OpenElement.
111 Id. The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the U.N. system made up of
forty-seven States responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights around the globe. Id.
112 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 25, ¶ 1.
113 Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9, at 3 (Oct. 6, 2010).
114 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, ¶ 1, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is the main international treaty setting forth economic, social, and
cultural rights. Id. Its sibling, the ICCPR, protects civil and political rights and freedoms. Health and Human
Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/hhr/Economic_social_cultural.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). The preambles of both
covenants emphasize the indivisibility and interdependence of the two categories of rights. See ICESCR,
supra, pmbl. Together, the UDHR and these two covenants constitute the International Bill of Human Rights.
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER OF THE HIGH COMM’R, supra note 108.
115 Id. art. 12.
110
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),116 the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW),117 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).118 Article
XI of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man further states
that “[e]very person has the right to the preservation of his health through sanitary
and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the
extent permitted by public and community resources.”119 In the context of a
developed nation, this requires access to utilities providing electricity for heat and
light, as well as water for hygiene and sanitation.
International authorities have also recognized that access to adequate
housing is crucial to a community’s health, and have called special attention to
the housing situations of historically marginalized communities in developed
countries. For example, the European Committee on Social Rights has repeatedly
held that the European Social Charter is violated when Roma people, a
historically marginalized community, are deprived of access to adequate housing,
including water and electricity service.120 While these opinions and the Revised
European Social Charter are not binding on the United States, the opinions do
establish that international legal principles of public health and equality require
access to adequate housing.
b. Water
The right to water has been enunciated no less than nine times in various
international instruments and declarations. The U.N. Millennium Declaration,
adopted in 2000, identified the goal of “halv[ing] the proportion of people who

116 G.A. Res. 2106, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Mar. 7, 1966), art 5(c)(iv) guarantees “[t]he right to public health, medical care, social security and social
services.”
117 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
118 U.N. Convention on the Right of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force on
Sept. 2, 1981) [hereinafter CRC]
119 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 101, art. 9.
120 See, e.g., European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. France, Complaint No. 51/2008, Eur. Comm. Soc.
Rights, ¶ 46 (Oct. 10, 2009), http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=cc-51-2008-dmerits-en (“Article 31§1 guarantees
access to adequate housing, which means a dwelling which . . . possesses all of the basic amenities, such as
water, heating, waste disposal, sanitation facilities, electricity”); European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v.
Bulgaria, Complaint No. 31/2005, Eur. Comm. Soc. Rights, ¶ 34 (Mar. 31, 2007), http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/
eng/?i=cc-51-2008-dmerits-en (“The Committee recalls that Article 16 guarantees adequate housing for the
family, which means a dwelling which . . . possesses all basic amenities, such as water, heating, waste
disposal, sanitation facilities, electricity; . . .”).
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are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.”121 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 54/175, which dealt with the right of developing nations
to become economically developed nations, affirms that all nations have a
“right to clean water.”122 The United Nations took further steps in promoting
the right to water in July 2010, when the U.N. General Assembly, in
Resolution 64/292, recognized “the right to safe and clean drinking water and
sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all
human rights.”123 The United Nations also called upon Member States to
provide the resources, particularly to developing countries, necessary to secure
this right for all.124 In September 2010, Resolution 64/292 was affirmed by the
Human Rights Council in Resolution 15/9.125 Also noteworthy is the 1949
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which
includes the provision of adequate drinking water.126
In General Comment 15, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights maintains that a fair and humane interpretation of the Charter
requires that all humans have a right to water.127 The Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, El Hadji Guisse, agreed that
“[r]ealization of the right to drinking water and sanitation” is required by the
Charter.128 The Charter guarantees a right to life, liberty and “security,” and
these rights are not attainable without “access to safe water.”129 The 2015 draft
report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review continues this
theme by stating that the United States needs “to implement the human right to
safe water and sanitation, ensuring this human right without discrimination for
121 U.N. Secretary-General, Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium
Declaration, ¶ 83, U.N. Doc. A/56/326 (Sept. 6, 2001).
122 The General Assembly “[r]eaffirms that, in the full realization of the right to development, inter alia:
(a) The rights to food and clean water are fundamental human rights.” G.A. Res. 54/175, ¶ 12 (Feb. 15, 2000).
123 G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1 (Aug. 3, 2010).
124 Id.
125 Id.; Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9 (Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter H.R.C.
Res. 15/9].
126 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 20, 26, 29, 46, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S. 135, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/prisonerwar.htm.
127 Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, ¶ 1
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) (“The human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human
dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights.”).
128 El Hadji Guissé (Special Rapporteur), Realization of the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation, U.N.,
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25 (July 11, 2005).
129 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY
AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 4 (2006), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/
2006%20Global%20HDR/HDR-2006-Beyond%20scarcity-Power-poverty-and-the-global-water-crisis.pdf
(quoting the U.N. Secretary General).
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the poorest sectors of the population, including indigenous peoples and
migrants.”130 Citing public health concerns rather than a particular legal charter
or agreement, organizations such as the World Health Organization have
similarly recognized the importance of access to safe water and sanitation.131
Some scholars have also identified the 1997 U.N. Convention on NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses as containing an explicit right
to water.132 Article 10 (2) states: “In the event of a conflict between uses of an
international watercourse, it shall be resolved . . . with special regard being
given to the requirements of vital human needs.”133
These instruments describe what some scholars would categorize as
“welfare” rights.134 Other instruments, however, describe the right to water as a
“liberty” right. The United States has signed two binding primary instruments
under this “liberty” umbrella. The first is the 1979 CEDAW.135 Among other
provisions is Article 14, which states that “[all nations] shall ensure to . . .
women the right . . . to enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation
to sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.”136
Second, Article 24(2)(c) of the CRC states that “[p]arties shall pursue full
implementation of [the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of health] and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures [to provide]. . .
clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of
environmental pollution.”137 Even though the United States has not ratified
theses treaties, they provide in combination the grounds for a binding,
customary international legal obligation for the United States.138

130 U.N. Human Rights Council, Draft rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review:
United States of America, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/22/L.10 (May 21, 2015).
131 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE RIGHT TO WATER 6 (2003) (“Access to safe water is a fundamental
human need and, therefore, a basic human right.”).
132 See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 544 (2007).
The author also notes that the Statement of Understanding attached to the Convention declares that in
determining vital human needs in the event of a conflict between the uses of watercourses, “special attention is
to be paid to providing sufficient water to sustain human life, including both drinking water and water required
for production of food in order to prevent starvation.” Id.
133 G.A. Res. 51/229, at 7 (July 8, 1997).
134 Rhett B. Larson, Holy Water and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples’ Religious-Rights Claims to
Water Resources, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 81, 89–91 (2011).
135 Ann M. Piccard, U.S. Ratification of CEDAW: From Bad to Worse?, 28 L. & INEQ. 119, 120 (2010).
136 CEDAW, supra note 117.
137 CRC, supra note 118.
138 Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from established state practice,
as opposed to obligations arising from formal written international treaties. See Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 U.S.T.S. 993.
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The right to water and other basic utilities is not restricted to these
instruments, however, and numerous monitoring bodies have explained that the
right to water, even when unmentioned, is implicit in various documents’
intentions. The U.N. Human Rights Council, for instance, has concluded that
the right to adequate standard of living, the right to health, and the right to life,
among others, imply a right to sanitary drinking water.139 The U.N. General
Assembly, keeping in mind the Human Rights Council’s conclusions,140
acknowledged that its own goals were incomprehensible without first
acknowledging that the right to water is an integral component of the
realization of all human rights outlined by the United Nations.141 Following
this show of support, the Human Rights Committee went further, saying that
beyond mere protection, certain human rights, this among them, are
accompanied by positive duties because, without ensuring all people certain
basic necessities, the United Nations’ political goals are meaningless.142 The
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has relied on these
determinations and gone still further, declaring that “[u]nder no circumstances
shall an individual be deprived of the minimum essential level of water.”143
Even the Committee Against Torture, which monitors the implementation of
the Convention Against Torture (CAT) prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment, has recognized instances of denials of access to water and
sanitation as within the purview of CAT.144
Many countries also individually recognize a fundamental human right to
water, either through their domestic law or constitutions. The European Court
of Human Rights has repeatedly and enthusiastically endorsed the right to
water in its judicial proceedings.145 And these are not simply unconnected
139 Catarina de Albuquerque (Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations related to
Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/24
(2009).
140 G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 123.
141 Id.
142 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 6, Article 6 (Sixteenth session, 1982), Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶¶ 1, 5, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994).
143 Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right to
Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 56, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2003).
144 Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture:
Tajikistan, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/TJK/CO/1 (2006).
145 See, e.g., Tadevosyan v Armenia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App no 41698/04) (2008); Riad and Idiab v Belgium,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (App nos 29787/03 and 29810/03) (2008); Eugen Gabriel Radu v Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App
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examples—more than thirty of the most recently adopted national constitutions
specifically recognize the right to water, and nearly double that number of
nations have adopted legislation to guarantee access to water.146
Countries where this right already exists constitutionally have seen the
greatest success in guaranteeing access to water. In Colombia, for instance, a
woman who lived with her partner and their two children (aged eleven and
five) in an area of extreme poverty, in a mid-size Colombian city, failed to pay
her water bills.147 The company stopped service, authorized by a regulation
that considers lack of payment a breach of contract.148 After a protracted battle,
the Court found that disrupting the supply of water violated the explicit
“constitutional right to water supply.”149 Since cutting off service was a
violation, the water company had a constitutional duty to reconnect.150
Some countries have greatly expanded their citizens’ access to water even
without constitutional enshrinement. India, for example, has recognized a right
to water that is not found explicitly within its constitution’s text.151 While
upholding the Indian government’s decision to construct over 3,000 dams on
the river Narmada, the Indian Supreme Court stated in Narmada Bachao
Andolan v. Union of India, that “[w]ater is the basic need for the survival of the
human beings and is part of right to life and human rights as enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution of India . . . .”152 In A.P. Pollution Control Board
v. Prof. M.V. Nayadu, the Court held that the right to access to drinking water
is fundamental to life and that the state has a duty under Article 21 to provide
clean drinking water to its citizens.153 In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, the
no 3036/04) (2009); Marian Stoicescu v Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App no 12934/02) (2009); Butan and
Dragomir v Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App no 40067/2006) (2008); Fedotov v Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App no
5140/02) (2005); Dubetska and Others v Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App no 30499/03) (2011); Melnik v Ukraine,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (App no 72286/2001) (2006); Zander v Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App no 14282/88) (1993).
146 See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996; Delhi Water Supply & Sewage Disposalundertaking & Anr. v. State
of Haryana & Ors., (1996) 2 SCC 572 (India); Pilchen v. City of Auburn, No. 5:08-CV-1064, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79379 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010).
147 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 6, 2009, D.C. Botogá, Sentencia T-546/09,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (p. 3) (Colom.).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 6–7.
150 Id.
151 Philippe Cullet, Right to Water in India Plugging Conceptual and Practical Gaps, 17 INT’L J. HUM.
RTS. 56, 61 (2013).
152 Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) AIR 2000 SCC 3751, ¶ 274 (India), http:www.
ielrc.org/content/c0001.pdf.
153 A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu and Ors., (2000) 3 SCALE 354, ¶¶ 3–4 (India),
www.ielrc.org/content/e0010.pdf.
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Supreme Court of India recognized that groundwater is a public asset, and that
citizens have the right to the use of air, water, and earth as implicitly protected
under Article 21 of the constitution.154
Another successful defense of the right to water was another liberty-rights
approach undertaken in the Mosetlhanyane case in Botswana.155 There,
Kalahari Bushmen secured the right to access wells traditionally used for
drinking water based on their constitutionally protected right to be free from
degrading or inhumane treatment and their religious rights laid out in the
Botswana constitution.156 Even though the national constitution of Botswana
did not provide for an express right to water, the Kalahari Bushmen secured a
right to water based on the connection between access to water resources and
an express liberty right embodied in the constitution.157
i. Equal Treatment
In addition to establishing a right to water, international human rights
sources provide that this right cannot be disregarded merely because of
undocumented immigration status.158 Article 7 in the UDHR states, “[a]ll are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to
such discrimination.”159 Specifically targeting undocumented immigrants to
deprive them of utilities is forbidden discrimination.160 Article 3 of ICESCR
also affirms that State Parties to the treaty will “ensure the equal right of men
and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set
forth in the present Covenant.”161 Under international law, all people are
granted equal protection, not merely those with legal immigration status in the
country where they reside.

154 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 3 SCALE 396, ¶¶ 45–47, http://www.ielrc.org/content/
e0409.pdf.
155 Mosetlhanyane et al. v. Attorney General of Botswana, BLR 1, 15–16, 24 (July 24, 2010), http://www.
escr-net.org/usr_doc/CKGR_judgment.pdf.
156 Id. at 16.
157 Id. at 29.
158 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 20(1).
159 Id.
160 See U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR), THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
ADEQUATE HOUSING, FACT SHEET NO. 21/REV.1 (2009), http://www.refworld.org/docid/479477400.html.
161 ICESCR, supra note 114.
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The United States has ratified multiple treaties that ban discrimination in
the provision of water and housing.162 The Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, the body of independent experts that monitors
implementation of CERD, has emphasized the importance of the equal
enjoyment of the right to housing without distinction as to race, color, or
national or ethnic origin,163 which should include access to water and
sanitation. The Committee has also expressed concern about sub-standard
housing conditions and services in impoverished African-American
communities in the United States.164
Arguments before the Human Rights Committee further bolster this point.
The Global Initiative for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (GI-ESCR)
came before the U.N. Human Rights Committee regarding the Israeli blockade
of the Gaza Strip and its impact on housing, water, sanitation, and access to
land in Palestine and Israel.165 There, GI-ESCR supported a broad
interpretation of the ICCPR to include the right to water and sanitation.166
Following the presentation, the Human Rights Committee “reaffirmed that
denial of access to food, water and sanitation in these contexts rose to
violations of Articles 6, 7 and 26 of the Covenant” and “called on Israel to
ensure and facilitate non-discriminatory access of Palestinians to land, natural
resources, water and sanitation.”167 This decision was built upon prior
determinations that access to safe drinking water is a fundamental human
right.168
162 See generally Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 28, June 30, 2009, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 (recognizing the right to clean water and housing without discrimination on the basis of disability).
163 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America, Seventy-Second Session, Feb. 18–Mar. 7,
2008, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008).
164 Id. ¶ 16.
165 GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, PARALLEL REPORT SUBMITTED
BY THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (GI-ESCR) TO THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON THE OCCASION OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF ISRAEL:
ISRAEL’S CONTINUED VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS WITH
REGARD TO HOUSE DEMOLTIONS, FORCED EVICTIONS AND SAFE AND ACCESSIBLE WATER AND SANITATION IN
OCCUPIED PALESTINE AND ISRAEL (2014), http://globalinitiative-escr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/140630GI-ESCR-Parallel-Report-ICCPR-Israel-2014.pdf.
166 Id. at 16–18.
167 Human Rights Committee Addresses Housing, Water, Sanitation and Access to Land in Palestine and
Israel, GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RTS. (Oct. 30, 2014), http://
globalinitiative-escr.org/human-rights-committee-addresses-housing-water-sanitation-and-access-to-land-inpalestine-and-israel/.
168 U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep. of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights on the Scope and Content of the Relevant Human Rights Obligations Related to Equitable Access to
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been equally vigorous in
its defense of a right to water. In one example, Vélez Loor v. Panama, the State
held Mr. Vélez Loor in a prison where drinking water was unavailable.169 The
Court held that “the absence of minimum conditions to guarantee the supply of
drinking water within a prison constitutes a serious failure by the State.”170 The
decision was, again, unsurprising given the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights’ jurisprudence.171
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights made a similar
determination.172 In Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, the African Commission held that the
Sudanese government’s efforts to force certain communities from their homes,
which ranged from organized terror campaigns by local militia to shutting off
or destroying utilities for designated population centers, directly conflicted
with the Banjul Charter.173
B. U.S. Response
Despite significant international pressure, the United States largely ignores
or rejects international instruments as binding. The U.S. view on water and
sanitation was succinctly expressed by the Deputy Representative to the

Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation Under International Human Rights Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/3
(Aug. 16, 2007).
169 Vélez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218 (Nov. 23, 2010).
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., Vélez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218 (Nov. 23, 2010); Xakmok Kasek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 21 (Aug. 24, 2010); Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement, Inter. Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 146 (Mar. 29 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125
(June 17, 2005).
172 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [ACHPR], Sudan Human Rights Organization &
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions/Sudan, at 23, 279/03–296/05 (May 13, 2009); see also About ACHPR,
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2017). The African Charter established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Id. The
Commission was inaugurated on November 2, 1987 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and was tasked with analyzing
and promoting progress in accordance with Article 62 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Id. Primarily by evaluating State Parties’ reports on legislative or other measures taken within their countries
to effectuate the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the Charter. Id.
173 See Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Dev. in Africa v. Angola, Communication 292/04, African Comm’n on
Hum. & Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 51 (May 22, 2008); Sudan Hum. Rts. Organisation & Ctr.
on Hous. Rts. & Evictions v. Sudan, Communication 279/03-296/05, African Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’
Rts. [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 124 (May 27, 2009).
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Economic and Social Council, John Sammis, in his note to President Obama
explaining the U.S. vote against Resolution A/64/L.63/Rev.1, colloquially
called “the Human Right to Water Resolution.”174 While acknowledging the
importance of water on both practical and political levels, Mr. Sammis stated
that the United States opposed the Resolution’s vision of a broad right to
water, arguing that there is “no ‘right to water and sanitation’ in an
international legal sense as described by this resolution.”175
By refusing to recognize an international right to water, Mr. Sammis
simply restated the U.S. line on the topic of water security.176 The primary
document for U.S. diplomats on the topic of water security is the “Views of the
United States of America on Human Rights and Access to Water.”177 This
document, submitted by the United States to the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, states: “Neither the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) nor the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) mentions water at all.”178 The “Views of the
United States of America” explicitly disagrees with the findings of GIICESCR. The document claims that water rights fall within the sole purview of
the various nation states, or—in the case of the United States—within the
individual state governments subsidiary to the federal government.179 In direct
opposition, GI-ICESCR, along with the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, assert that the “legal bases of the right to water” is
contained in Article 11(1) of the ICESCR.180 In rebuttal, the United States
maintains that “while it is apparent enough that this provision of the Covenant
does not create an open-ended” list, any doubt at all is “dispelled by the
following sentence which states: ‘[t]he States Parties will take appropriate
174 Letter from John Sammis, U.S. Deputy Representative, Econ. and Soc. Council, to Barack Obama,
U.S. President (July 28, 2010), http://usun.state.gov/remarks/4749.
175 Id.
176 See Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, and the
Controversy Over Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 102–03 (2013); Letter from the U.S. to the
Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights on Views of the United States of America on
Human Rights and Access to Water (June 2007), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/contributions/
UnitedStatesofAmerica.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Letter to OHCHR].
177 U.S. Letter to OHCHR, supra note 176, at 1.
178 Id. at 2.
179 Id. at 6.
180 ICESCR, supra note 114, art. 11 (“[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”); see also General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights on Its Twenty-Second Session, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
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steps to ensure the realization of this right . . . .’”181 The United States also
argues that “[t]he fact that the provision of a particular good or service may be
essential to the realization of a Covenant right does not make that good or
service itself the subject of a distinct international human right.”182 In other
words, even though clean, safe water is necessary for the protection of many
human rights, the United States fails to recognize the right to water because it
is not a distinct and enunciated human right in itself.183
Even when the United States does ratify a treaty, the U.S. Senate limits
adherence by declaring reservations at the time of ratification.184 Most
countries follow this practice,185 but U.S. reservations are particularly broad.
The Senate’s ratification of CERD is representative of this practice. In that
case, the Senate reiterated many of the reservations expressed during the
debate over its ratification, writing:
[T]hat the Constitution and laws of the United States contain
extensive protections of individual freedom of speech, expression and
association. Accordingly, the United States does not accept any
obligation under this Convention, in particular under Articles 4 and 7,
to restrict those rights, through the adoption of legislation or any
other measures, to the extent that they are protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.186

As the Supreme Court noted in Sosa v. Álvarez-Machain,187 the presence of
these provisions prevents the treaties from being reasonably interpreted as selfexecuting. Therefore, such treaties cannot be enforced by U.S. courts. Any
remedy for a violation of the treaty would have to come from the legislative, or
perhaps even the executive branch.
Multiple U.S. states have expressed unwillingness to enforce international
treaties in the absence of implementing domestic legislation. In Connecticut,

181

U.S. Letter to OHCHR, supra note 176, at 4.
Id.
183 See id.; see also Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a
Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 346–49 (2005).
184 VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RES. SERV., SENATE CONSIDERATION OF TREATIES 2 (Nov. 10, 2014).
185 See, e.g., Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Chapter IV. Human Rights,
U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en (last visited
Mar. 19, 2017); follow hyperlink entitled “3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
New York, 16 December 1966”; then scroll down for a list of all the reservations that other countries made
before ratifying it.
186 140 CONG. REC. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994).
187 Sosa v. Álvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004).
182
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for example, both the Connecticut Supreme Court in 2000188 and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in 2001189 provided clear guidance and thoughtful
discussion of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction and its implementing state and federal statutes.190 There, even
though both courts acknowledged that they were sympathetic to the aim of the
treaty and understood its persuasive value, the analysis began and ended with
the implementing statutes passed by state and federal governments.191
There has been remarkably limited traction in applying international
normative law in U.S. courts.192 This is well illustrated by the lack of a national
constitutional right to water, which also usually does not exist at the state
level.193 But this has not stopped many advocates who have proceeded to attain
recognition for the right to water in state constitutions through the legislative
process. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts194 and
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania195 outline a right to water,
and California has adopted the right to water through a Senate Bill that
clarified the stance of California’s constitution on the subject of the right to
water.196 Although difficult to achieve, such advances based on international
legal arguments are possible.
Interestingly, both the greatest possibilities and challenges exist on the dayto-day courtroom level. Indeed, one human rights scholar pointed out nearly a
decade ago that principles of international human rights law “have been used
to assist in the interpretation of state and federal laws. The law, with few
exceptions, has been briefed by amici curiae or raised by the courts
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themselves.”197 Small inroads along these lines are often made. For example,
advocates have effectively used international law to create a “broader approach
to proving discriminatory intent” at the trial court level.198 International law
has also been used to influence how courts determined custody battles utilizing
the “best interest of the child” test.199 In practice, this means that within the
realm of water rights and utilities, international human rights arguments are as
of yet underemployed tools. Although not conclusively deciding factors,
international law arguments could lend weight to cases that would otherwise be
significantly weaker, potentially tipping the scales in favor of change.
CONCLUSION
The problem of SSN requirements for public utility services can be
approached in multiple ways, using both the domestic and international law
frameworks. Particularly in jurisdictions that recognize the applicability of
Privacy Act § 7 to state and local governments, plaintiffs have a relatively high
chance of success by using a Privacy Act challenge against a publicly-run
utility provider. In other jurisdictions, and particularly if the local utility
provider is a private company, plaintiffs may be forced to bring a Fair Housing
Act claim that requires intensive factual development on the statistical
evidence and the cause of the disparate impact. This difficulty may be lessened
somewhat by the availability of an administrative process for resolving FHA
claims through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Particularly in a federal court challenge, advocates should consider
employing international legal authorities and norms to frame their arguments
and highlight the importance of the challenge. U.S. courts may be persuaded
by the fundamental principles of security of person, equal protection, and
human dignity. Immigrants’ rights advocates may also consider appealing to
these principles while pursuing policy changes at the state and local levels that
promote equal access to housing.
Utility denials like those in Alabama and Georgia can be viewed through
many different lenses that dramatically alter the scope of the legal issue. These
policies demonstrate how anti-immigrant discrimination has become subtler
197
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and couched in seemingly mundane, reasonable mechanisms, such as the SSN
requirement. The utility provider’s handling of one blank space on an
application form—the space for a SSN—can have the effect of restricting
noncitizens’ access to housing in the area. More broadly, that one space on the
application form can have the effect of denying undocumented people their
basic human rights to security of person, equal protection, and the right to live
with dignity. Correspondingly, advocates have the option of using the Privacy
Act to specifically challenge the SSN requirement, the Fair Housing Act to
challenge the disparate impact on immigrants, and international legal
authorities to highlight the far-reaching effect on immigrants’ human rights.
Sometimes, advocates’ sweeping goals of protecting immigrants’ human rights
and dignity may be better served by a narrow challenge on Privacy Act
grounds. Given the pervasiveness and subtlety of some state and local efforts
to create an inhospitable environment for immigrants, advocates should be
prepared to use all of the tools at their disposal to challenge these policies.

